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Formalism, Realism, and Patent Scope
7XQ-HQ&KLDQJ
INTRODUCTION
A popular theme these days when discussing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
is that it is “formalist.”1 According to this developing meme, the Federal Circuit prefers
rigid, sweeping, legalistic rules that fail to adequately consider complex policy judgments;
DQGLWLVWKHQUHYHUVHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWIRUWKLVLQÁH[LELOLW\2 Various theories are put
forward to explain the Federal Circuit’s penchant for formalistic analysis. Peter Lee argues
that it is because generalist judges, especially district court judges, are psychologically
averse to complex technology, and therefore use formalist rules to avoid grappling with
complex issues.3 Attributing the same result from a diametrically opposite cause is Jeffrey
Lefstin, who argues that the Federal Circuit’s formalistic jurisprudence is the legacy of its
predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, a specialized court that reviewed
GHFLVLRQVIURPWKH3DWHQWDQG7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH4 Instead of an aversion to complex
technology—rather implausible in the context of the CCPA—Lefstin argues that the court
adopted a formalistic view of patent law in order to assert control over the more technically
sophisticated tribunal beneath it.5 Although these commentators disagree radically on the
causes of formalism, they agree that the Federal Circuit is formalistic.
My goal in this Essay is to challenge this emerging wisdom, or at least qualify its contours,
in the area of patent scope, an area on which many critics of Federal Circuit formalism focus

* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. Thanks to Peter Lee and Richard Posner for comments. The views expressed are my own.
1. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792 (2003).
2. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1125-26 (2003) (“[M]ore rigorous Supreme Court review[] should dislodge the Federal
Circuit from its rigid adherence to formalism.”); see also Timothy Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based
Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005) (arguing that the Federal Circuit prefers “substantive” formalism while the Supreme Court prefers “process-based” formalism).
3. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 29-32 (2010) (“[H]ypertextualism partially
LQVXODWHVERWKWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWMXGJHDQGDSSHOODWHMXGJHVIURPFHUWDLQGLIÀFXOWWHFKQRORJLFDOO\LQWHQVLYHLQquiries.”).
4. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape
of the Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843 (2010).
5. Id. at 858.
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their analysis.6 The Federal Circuit is not a formalistic court in practice. To be sure, the
Federal Circuit often uses formalist-sounding rhetoric, but such is true of many other
courts and judges.7 The contribution of Legal Realism was that despite such rhetoric,
judges in fact were not jurisprudential machines, and legal decisions were not purely
the result of logical deduction from precedent and doctrine.8 Such is no less true of the
Federal Circuit. To speak of the Federal Circuit as a formalistic court is thus to elevate
the court’s rhetoric over its actual jurisprudence.
2QFHZHORRNEH\RQGWKHUKHWRULFWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VMXULVSUXGHQFHLVMXVWDVÁH[LEOH
and indeterminate as any other area of law. This is particularly true of patent scope,
the main focus of this Essay. The Federal Circuit’s wide discretion over patent scope
through claim interpretation and determination of claim validity through enablement is
widely known.9 This has been known at least since Merges and Nelson argued that patent
EUHDGWKUDWKHUWKDQWKHVWDWXWRULO\À[HGSDWHQWWHUPZDVWKHVXSHULRULQVWUXPHQWRI
effectuating the utilitarian policy of the patent system.10
There is some tension, then, between two oft-heard claims regarding the Federal
&LUFXLW·VSDWHQWVFRSHMXULVSUXGHQFH7KHÀUVWFODLPLVWKDWWKLVMXULVSUXGHQFH
is formalistic. The second is that this jurisprudence is wildly unpredictable and
indeterminate.11 If formalism means adherence to rigid and deterministic rules, then these
two propositions almost necessarily contradict each other on the level of actual results.
The ironic consequence of subscribing to formal rhetoric while exercising pragmatic
judgment sub rosa is that the Federal Circuit is criticized for both.12 Again, however, this
phenomenon is ubiquitous across the law—almost every court pretends that it has less
discretion than in actuality; and exposing this fact was a key point of the Legal Realism
movement.

6. See Holbrook, supra note 2; Lee, supra note 3, at 29; Lefstin, supra note 4, at 879; Thomas, supra note
1, at 792 (“Some of the most prominent principles of the patent law, governing the subject matter that can be
patented, rights acquisition, and the scope of protection, have become more rulebound.”).
7. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & Craig Lerner, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV.   GHVFULELQJWKH6RWRPD\RUFRQÀUPDWLRQKHDULQJWHVWLPRQ\ 
8. See, e.g., K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69 (1951) (“People—and
they are curiously many—who think that precedent produces or ever did produce a certainty that did not involve matters of judgment . . . do not know our system of precedent.”).
9. See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
1, 33 (2007).
10. Robert P. Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Claim Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839 (1990).
11. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009) (arguing that because claim interpretation is so unpredictable, peripheral claims
should be abolished).
12. Cf. Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1671 (2003) (“The
Federal Circuit has proven particularly resistant to considering patent policy in making its decisions.”).

IP THEORY

Volume 1: Issue 2

89

I. FORMALISM DEFINED
Stated generally, formalism is the philosophy that law is a self-contained discipline, and that
there is always one “correct” answer to legal problems that can be reached using the internal
tools of the discipline,13 primarily logic, precedent, and rules. This is used in contradistinction
to realism, which argues that, at least in some cases, the tools of formal legal analysis will
not produce a single correct answer, and that legal decision-makers will in such cases refer
to extra-legal policy considerations. Realism (at least its moderate strains) does not imply
there is no right answer at all to cases, but holds instead that the right answers often cannot
be arrived at using law alone and requires consideration of broader non-legal sources such as
economic policy or industry custom.14 The dispute is less one about whether case outcomes are
determinate or correct and more about the triggers that determine such outcomes.15
)URPWKLVJHQHUDOGHÀQLWLRQRIIRUPDOLVPLWLVXVHIXOWRIXUWKHUVXEGLYLGHWKHVFKRROV
of formalist thought. The extreme version of formalism may be described as “mechanical
jurisprudence,” which is the belief that not only is there a right answer to legal questions
that can be derived using the internal sources of the legal discipline, but that this correct
answer can be rather straightforwardly deduced through a mechanical process.16 Although
practically no modern legal academic believes that mechanical jurisprudence is an even
remotely accurate way to describe the operation of our legal system,17 it holds powerful sway
over popular discussion of law and the judicial role.
A less ambitious theory of formalism is associated primarily with Ronald Dworkin.
Dworkin acknowledges that legal reasoning is not a mechanical exercise, and that legal
answers require exercising judgment.18 The only thing that makes a scholar like Dworkin
a formalist is his thesis that there is a “right” answer to every legal question based on legal
tools,19 even though reasonable judges can and often will disagree on what that right answer

13. Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism8&KL/5HY   GHÀQLQJWKLVDVµFODVVLFDO
formalism”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 955 (1988) (“[F]ormalism postulates that
juridical content can somehow sustain itself from within.”).
14. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 281-85
(1997).
15. Id. at 278 (“What the descriptive Formalist really claims is that judges are (primarily) responsive to legal
reasons, while the Realist claims that judges are (primarily) responsive to nonlegal reasons.”).
16. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 523 (1988) (arguing that “[m]echanical deducibility need
not entail closure” and “nonmechanical judgments can be made within the boundaries of a single system”).
17. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 147 (1949) (“[T]he idea of a ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ was an absurdity.”).
18. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 240-50, 254-58 (1986). In many ways, Dworkin’s approach requires an
extremely expansive conception of what constitutes “law,” as it also includes various moral considerations. Id.
at 255-56; Emily Sherwin, Rules-Oriented Realism, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1578 n.2 (2005).
19. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975); RONALD DWORKIN, Pragmatism and
Law, in JUSTICE IN ROBES 36, 42 (2006) (arguing that lawyers making legal arguments show that they believe
there is a right answer to the case, “as a matter of ordinary legal judgment”).
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is.20 The concession that many people will disagree on what the right answer is makes
WKHULJKWDQVZHUWKHVLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQWHVWDEOHDQGXQIDOVLÀDEOH21 Absent the stronger
premise of mechanical jurisprudence that the correct legal answer can be discerned in
some predictable manner using a limited tool set, the divide between formalists and realists
is more theoretical than practical, since realists too acknowledge judges seek to reach a
correct result—they just think that judges refer to extra-legal tools.22
Formalism, especially in its mechanical jurisprudence guise, is associated with rules.23
Rules are supposed to cabin judicial discretion and provide determinate answers.24 The
association is only a loose one, since almost everyone acknowledges that the legal system
does not rely solely on mechanical rules.25 Conversely, Legal Realists do not deny that courts
often do proclaim rigid rules that dictate particular outcomes in particular situations. Instead,
realism views legal doctrine as hopelessly indeterminate not (or, at least, not
primarily) because of the indeterminacy of discrete doctrinal sources but
mainly because of their multiplicity. The indeterminacy of legal doctrine
GHULYHVÀUVWDQGIRUHPRVWIURPWKHDYDLODEOHOHHZD\LQFKRRVLQJWKH
applicable rule rather than from the ambiguity of that rule once chosen.26
The question is not whether there are rules, but whether the rules combine to produce a
determinate answer.
II. HIDDEN REALISM IN PATENT SCOPE
The indeterminacy of legal doctrine in the area of patent scope is so well known as
to require little elaboration here. As background, patent scope is governed primarily by
WZRLQVWUXPHQWV$WDÀUVWOHYHOFRXUWVUHJXODWHWKHSUDFWLFDOSDWHQWVFRSHE\LQWHUSUHWLQJ
claims broadly or narrowly.27 In addition, courts can regulate patent breadth by invalidating
a claim for being unduly broad, which in modern doctrine is done under the rubric of
section 112 of the patent statute.28 Both of these doctrinal tools—claim construction
and section 112 enablement doctrine—are discretionary policy instruments rather than

20. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 240-50, 254-58.
21. See George C. Christie, Dworkin’s Empire, 1987 DUKE L.J. 157, 184-85 (1987).
22. Leiter, supra note 14, at 278.
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers
Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998); see also Lee, supraQRWHDW GHÀQLQJIRUPDOLVPDV
“decisionmaking according to rule”).
24. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1688
(1976).
25. FRANK, supra note 17, at 147.
26. Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 613 (2007).
27. Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 219 (2010)
(“[N]early everything in a patent case turns on claim construction.”).
28. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

IP THEORY

Volume 1: Issue 2

91

formalist rules. This indeterminacy is not because courts have not pronounced bright-line
rules, but instead because courts have proclaimed multiple bright-line rules that contradict
each other. The choice among the ostensibly bright-line rules thereby becomes the source
of legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion.29
The contradiction of bright-line rules in the claim construction context is well known,
as is the uncertainty caused by this doctrinal indeterminacy.307KHÀUVWUXOHRIFODLP
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVWKDWFODLPVPXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHG´LQWKHOLJKWRI>WKHLU@VSHFLÀFDWLRQVµ31 The
second rule of claim interpretation is that a court must never “import[] limitations from the
VSHFLÀFDWLRQLQWRWKHFODLPµ32 Since a claim is only a set of limitations listing what features an
accused product must contain to infringe, the effect of interpreting a claim by reference to the
VSHFLÀFDWLRQLVQHFHVVDULO\WRDGGOLPLWDWLRQVWKDWDFRXUWRWKHUZLVHZRXOGQRWUHDGLQWRWKH
claim. In other words, if a court would reach exactly the same interpretation whether or not
LWFRQVLGHUVWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQWKHQWKHÀUVWUXOHRIFODLPLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZRXOGEHPHDQLQJOHVV
But a court reaching a different interpretation becauseLWFRQVLGHUHGWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQWKHUHE\
LPSRUWVDOLPLWDWLRQIURPLW7KHWZRUXOHVWKXVÁDWO\FRQWUDGLFWHDFKRWKHU33
$VLPLODUVHWRIFRQWUDGLFWRU\UXOHVLQÁLFWVWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VMXULVSUXGHQFHRQVHFWLRQ
112. At one level, the simple notion of quid pro quo suggests that patent scope may only
cover the embodiments that the patentee contributes to the public through disclosure in
WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ34 Thus one line of cases requires that the claim be limited to only what is
WDXJKWRU´HQDEOHGµE\WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQDWWKHWLPHRISDWHQWÀOLQJ35 On the other hand, such
a formula would eviscerate patent incentives, since later-arising technology would predictably
create improvements that function as close substitutes, but would not have been taught (nor
FRXOGWKH\KDYHEHHQWDXJKW E\WKHSDWHQWHHDWÀOLQJ36 Thus, another line of cases holds that

29. Dogan, supra note 26, at 613.
30. Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in
Claim Construction, 42 IDEA 1, 2 (2002) (describing uncertainty); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233, 239 (2005) (reporting a
34.5% reversal rate for claim construction).
31. Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940).
32. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
33. See Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is someWLPHVDÀQHOLQHEHWZHHQUHDGLQJDFODLPLQOLJKWRIWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQDQGUHDGLQJDOLPLWDWLRQLQWRWKHFODLP
IURPWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQµ 5REHUW8QLNHO 'RXJODV(YHOHLJKProtecting Inventors, Not Fortune Tellers: The
Available Patent Protection for After-Developed Technologies, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 88 n.9 (2006) (“How one
FDQUHDGFODLPV¶LQOLJKWRIWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ·EXW\HWDYRLGLPSRUWLQJOLPLWDWLRQVIURPWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQKDV
never been adequately explained, perhaps because these ostensibly contradictory tenets of claim construction
cannot be reconciled.”).
2·5HLOO\Y0RUVH86   ´7KHVSHFLÀFDWLRQRIWKLVSDWHQWHHGHVFULEHVKLVLQYHQWLRQRU
discovery and the manner and process of constructing and using it; and his patent . . . covers nothing more.”).
35. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
36. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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the patentee may claim undisclosed and untaught embodiments, apparently without any
À[HGOLPLWV37 Once again, the two lines of cases directly contradict each other.38
1RWRQO\DUHWKHUHLUUHFRQFLODEOHFRQÁLFWVLQGRFWULQHWKHVHFRQÁLFWVDUHHVVHQWLDOWRWKH
proper functioning of the patent system, because each line of cases has severe defects that
are responsible for the contrary line.39 Limiting the patentee to the embodiments taught by
WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQ³HLWKHUWKURXJKD´VRIWµGRFWULQHRIFUHDWLYHO\LQWHUSUHWLQJFODLPODQJXDJH
WRDOZD\VEHFRQÀQHGWRVSHFLÀFDWLRQHPERGLPHQWRUD´KDUGµGRFWULQHRILQYDOLGDWLQJDQ\
claims that go beyond this—might be a principled implementation of the patent quid pro
quo, but it would result in the practical outcome of destroying all patent incentives. On the
other hand, permitting patentees to broadly cover later-arising improvements that were not
WDXJKWE\WKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQZLOOUHVXOWLQH[FHVVLYHPRQRSRO\FRVWV2QO\E\VHOHFWLYHO\
oscillating between contradictory bright-line rules does the Federal Circuit maintain
VXIÀFLHQWGLVFUHWLRQWRDFKLHYHVRPHEDODQFHLQSDWHQWVFRSH7RDGRSWHLWKHURIWKH
absolutist rules suggested by the case law would result in a radically skewed patent system.
7KHSRLQWLVWKHUHIRUHQRWWKDWWKHFRQÁLFWLQGRFWULQHLVDEDGWKLQJ,QIDFWGRFWULQDO
FRQÁLFWDQGKLGGHQUHDOLVPLVRQEDODQFHDJRRGWKLQJDWOHDVWLQFRPSDULVRQWRDQ
alternative where courts mechanically abide by one extreme line or another and thus either
DZDUGSDWHQWVRIYLUWXDOO\QRVFRSHRUYLUWXDOO\LQÀQLWHVFRSH7KHFRQWUDGLFWRU\FDVHODZ
DQGODFNRIGHWHUPLQDWHPHFKDQLFDORXWFRPHVGRHVFUHDWHVLJQLÀFDQWXQFHUWDLQW\ZKLFKLV
usually undesirable.407KHNH\SRLQWUHPDLQVWKDWHYHQZLWKVXFKVLJQLÀFDQWXQFHUWDLQW\WKH
current system—a very realist system that relies heavily on hidden discretion in picking and
FKRRVLQJDPRQJFRQWUDGLFWRU\FDVHVWKURXJKLPSOLFLWFRVWEHQHÀWEDODQFLQJ³LVVWLOOYDVWO\
preferable to the disastrous system that would result if courts actually practiced mechanical
jurisprudence by following a single set of bright-line rules, in addition to merely preaching it.
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE REALIST ANALYSIS
A. Does the Federal Circuit Really Rely on Policy Balancing?
Even accepting that judges possess discretion to choose among the rules, I cannot
prove that judges are using extra-legal considerations such as economic balancing and

37. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that a claim is not
invalid even if it “reads on another embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed”); see also
Morley Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 273 (1889) (“[A]ll subsequent machines which employ
substantially the same means to accomplish the same result are infringements, although the subsequent machine may contain improvements . . . .”).
38. Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1087 (2009).
39. See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1434465; Jeffrey A.
Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141
(2009) (arguing that enablement doctrine cannot be formally realized).
40. Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 547 (2010).
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technological context to guide their decisions. Perhaps, as Dworkin might argue, judges
faced with hard legal questions are still looking to reconcile the apparently contradictory
GRFWULQHDVEHVWDVWKH\FDQVRWKDWODWHUGHFLVLRQV´ÀWµZLWKHDUOLHUGHFLVLRQVOLNHDFKDLQ
novel.417KXVZKLOHGHPRQVWUDWLQJODWHQWGLVFUHWLRQLQSDWHQWVFRSHGRFWULQHLVVXIÀFLHQWWR
rebut the kind of mechanical formalism—“decisionmaking according to rule”—that Lee
theorizes,42 it does not rebut more nuanced styles of formalism as descriptive theories of
patent scope jurisprudence. And because the subjective decision-making process of judges
is inscrutable, no conclusive proof can be had on this issue.
In some ways, whether judges perceive their own discretion, and how they exercise it,
DUHTXHVWLRQVWKDWQHHGQRWEHFRQVLGHUHGLQDUHIXWDWLRQRIIRUPDOLVP,WVXIÀFHVWRVKRZ
that the discretion exists, so that formal doctrine is not determinate. Again, at a minimum,
VXFKDVKRZLQJLVVXIÀFLHQWWRGHIHDWWKHPHFKDQLFDOMXULVSUXGHQFHUXOHERXQGYDULHW\RI
formalism.
At the same time, one observation strongly suggests that judges are in fact making
pragmatic decisions according to extra-formal policy considerations, whether consciously
or subconsciously. I am referring to the Federal Circuit’s rule mandating that evidence
regarding the accused product be presented to it when appealing issues of textual claim
interpretation,43 even though strictly speaking such evidence is completely irrelevant under
any understanding of formal doctrine.
Under the formal theory of claim interpretation, the point of interpreting claims is simply
to ascertain the meaning of the text.44 This is true whether that interpretation is aided by the
VSHFLÀFDWLRQRUQRW7KHUHLVQRFRQFHLYDEOHUHDVRQWKDWWKHDFFXVHGSURGXFWLVUHOHYDQWWR
WKLVWH[WXDOH[HUFLVHDQGHDUO\)HGHUDO&LUFXLWFDVHVVWDWHGÁDWO\WKDWFODLPVDUHQRWWREH
interpreted in light of the accused device:
A claim is construed in the light of the claim language, the other claims, the
SULRUDUWWKHSURVHFXWLRQKLVWRU\DQGWKHVSHFLÀFDWLRQnot in light of the
accused device. Contrary to what [the accused infringer] wrote the district
court, claims are not construed “to cover” or “not to cover” the accused device. That procedure would make infringement a matter of judicial whim.45

41. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 229-30.
42. Lee, supra note 3, at 29.
-DQJY%RVWRQ6FLHQWLÀF&RUS)G )HG&LU  ´:LWKRXWNQRZOHGJHRIWKHDFcused products, this court cannot assess the accuracy of the infringement judgment under review and lacks a
proper context for an accurate claim construction.” (quoting Lava Trading, Inc. v. Sonic Trading Mgmt., LLC,
445 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006))).
44. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim language . . . .”).
45. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis in
original).
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In a string of cases beginning with Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby
Co.,46 the Federal Circuit has twisted this evidentiary rule 180 degrees, so that the
procedure is now exactly what the Federal Circuit had once condemned as opening the
door to “judicial whim.” Under its latest decision in this line, the appellate record must
FRQWDLQVXIÀFLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQIRUWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWWRNQRZZK\WKHDFFXVHGSURGXFW
would infringe under one claim construction and would not under an alternative.47 If this
is not construing a claim “‘to cover’ or ‘not to cover’ the accused device,” then nothing
is. The logical inference from this mandatory requirement of presenting what is, formally
speaking, completely irrelevant evidence is that the judges regard such extra-formal
considerations as highly relevant to their actual decision-making. And although Wilson is
a relatively new rule, the Federal Circuit’s longstanding (but unwritten) practice of never
certifying interlocutory appeals on claim construction also achieved much of the same
HIIHFWRIHQVXULQJWKDWWKHDSSHOODWHUHFRUGXVXDOO\FRQWDLQHGVXIÀFLHQW´FRQWH[WµWRDOORZ
pragmatic decision-making since an appeal could only happen after a summary judgment
or trial record was assembled.48
To say that the Federal Circuit is a realistic court despite its formalist rhetoric does not
imply or require the judges to be acting in a massive conspiracy of deception. Certainly
it does not suggest that all judges are politicians in robes, as caricatures of legal realism
often suggest.49 All it requires is that the discretionary choices rely on intuition, and such
intuition is frequently unperceived and unconscious. For example, suppose that a scientist
LQYHQWVDSLOOWKDWFXUHV$,'6ZULWHVDVSHFLÀFDWLRQWKDWIXOO\GHVFULEHVKRZWRPDNHWKH
cure and demonstrates it is 100% effective in curing AIDS, and then writes a claim for “a
pill that cures AIDS.” Suppose then a pirate makes a exact replica of the pill. Almost any
judge—indeed almost any person—would agree that there is only one “right” answer to
the infringement case: the pirate is clearly infringing.
At the same time, this result is only “easy” when considered entirely using extra-formal
considerations and not using formal legal reasoning. Under the formal legal doctrine,
plausible arguments can be made either way regarding whether the claim to “a pill that cures
AIDS” is validly enabled. The inventor has not taught every future pill that cures AIDS, he
has described only one such pill, and under quid pro quo line of enablement cases the claim
would be invalid.50 But there is no reasonable judge who would rule in this way, and no
plausible lawyer who would even advise the pirate to bring the case to litigation. For a judge
to rule for the patentee requires no bad faith or disingenuousness, the judge is simply not

46. 442 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
47. Jang, 532 F.3d at 1338.
48. Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371, 1377 n.31 (2010).
49. See Christopher Wolfe, The Senate’s Power to Give “Advice and Consent” in Judicial Appointments, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 355, 366 (1999) (“The predominant lens through which legal history is viewed today is legal
realism, which, in varying degrees according to its more or less extreme forms, holds that judges are basically
‘politicians in robes.’”)
50. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36.
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perceiving that the formal doctrine is incoherent and there are two possible answers among
ZKLFKKHPXVWDFWXDOO\FKRRVH,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHMXGJHFRPPLWVWKHHUURURIFRQÁDWLQJWKH
answer that he thinks doctrine should give with the answer he thinks the doctrine then does
give.51 Such mixing of normative and descriptive implies neither that judges are stupid nor
that they are deceptive, but only that they are human.
B. Does Recognizing Hidden Realism Matter?
One criticism of the foregoing analysis might be that my disagreement with Lee, Lefstin,
and others who argue the Federal Circuit is formalistic is overstated or even non-existent.
The Federal Circuit certainly often uses formalist rhetoric. Thus, Lee, Lefstin, and others
describe what the Federal Circuit says, and I describe what the Federal Circuit does. There
is no necessary inconsistency in these descriptive claims. At the same time, recognizing
the Federal Circuit’s actual jurisprudence as realist carries implications regarding why that
court’s rhetoric remains formalist—implications that are in tension with many conventional
accounts.
To take one example, Lee argues in his article that the Federal Circuit is formalistic
because it and lower court judges seek to avoid interacting with complex technology,
and having hard mechanical rules triggered by such things as text avoids complex policy
balancing.52 For this motivation to work—for judges actually to be able to avoid considering
complex technology—the doctrine must remove discretion to consider technological
context in actual practice, or at least delude lower courts into believing as much.53 If,
notwithstanding the rhetoric, everyone knows that patent scope is actually discretionary,
then everyone still has to consider technological context, but now additionally must dress
everything up behind legalistic mumbo-jumbo. Instead of allowing judges to be cognitive
misers, formalism would actually add to their workload. To recognize the Federal Circuit’s
patent scope jurisprudence as heavily realist would thus cast doubt on Lee’s theory.
In a similar vein, Lefstin’s theory that the Federal Circuit’s formalism is a carryover from
the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals’ project to exert control over the PTO would only
work if the formal doctrine imposed practical limits on discretion, or at least convinced
the lower agency that there were such limits. If everyone knew that formal doctrine was
empty rhetoric and the appellate court was in fact exercising policy-based discretion,

51. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 213 (2008) (“When a judge does bend a rule to avoid an awful
result, he does not feel that he is engaging in civil disobedience; he thinks the rule does not really compel the
awful result.”).
52. Lee, supra note 3, at 25-26.
53. Lee disclaims any claim of conscious intent on the part of Federal Circuit judges to create formalist rules
in order to avoid interacting with technology. Id. at 28-29. But this makes the aversion-to-technology theory
even more implausible. It is unlikely that judges with an aversion to technology would subconsciously create a jurisprudence that still requires them to consider technological context, but hides the inquiry so that they
have less information and fewer expert witnesses to help them in the task.
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then the charade would collapse. Of course, the appellate court still may assert control
through de novo review, but it could have done that directly by making a naked powergrab. Presumably the point of using formalist rhetoric is to avoid the naked power-grab
that would have provoked political resistance. If so, cloaking a power-grab in formalist
rhetoric is useful only to the extent that the cloaking rhetoric deceives somebody. Again, if
the point of formalism was to allow greater control over the PTO, it is not clear why empty
formalism that is also known to be empty would help in the slightest.
The problem for both theories is that the Federal Circuit’s formalist rhetoric has not
lived up to the promise of producing actual binding rules in the area of patent scope, so the
rhetoric is empty. Moreover, by now, everybody involved with the patent system has been
clued-in on the secret, at least to some degree. Complaints about the unpredictability and
indeterminacy of patent scope doctrine are legion and exhaustively documented.54 If the
goal of the Federal Circuit in proclaiming formalistic rules was to assert greater control
over lower agencies or prevent judges from considering complex technological problems,
then these are at most failed and futile exercises in wishful thinking. The cost of this failed
experiment has been to drive the discretion underground, so less information is available to
make considered policy judgments, while the same policy judgments must still be made.
A broader look, however, suggests an explanation for the Federal Circuit’s formalistic
rhetoric that makes its continuation entirely unsurprising even if insiders of the patent
V\VWHPDUHJHQHUDOO\DZDUHRILWVHPSWLQHVVVLQFHWKLVMXVWLÀFDWLRQLVQRWSDWHQWVSHFLÀF
but is instead shared with every other court. The broader look reveals that every court
regularly uses formalistic rhetoric; and indeed the more policy discretion a court has,
the more the court takes pains to deny that such discretion exists.55 The reason is that
courts perceive the need to invoke formalism to preserve their legitimacy in the eyes of
the general public.567KLVSHUFHSWLRQLVIXOO\MXVWLÀHGJLYHQWKDWWKHSXEOLFORYHVWKHLGHD
of mechanical jurisprudence and every judicial nominee swears a blood oath before the
Senate to practice it.57 Unlike the insiders of the patent system who have all become clued-

54. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe
for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 202-17 (2001); Bernard H.
Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 50–52; Russell B. Hill
& Frank P. Cote, Ending the Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Claim Construction,
42 IDEA 1 (2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231 (2005).
55. POSNER, supra note 51, at 51 (Legalism “is proclaimed most emphatically by Justices of the Supreme Court,
since the Court is in fact a political court . . . and therefore especially in need of protective coloration.”).
56. Or Bassok, 7KH6RFLRORJLFDO/HJLWLPDF\'LIÀFXOW\, 26 J.L. Pol. 239, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1691399; Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011 (2007).
57. See Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning Politicians to the Supreme Court, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1376-77 (2010) (“[N]ominees now present themselves as the law’s servants, robotically
applying legal rules to the case at hand . . . .”).
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in to the Federal Circuit’s latent discretion, the general public may well remain convinced
WKDWSDWHQWVFRSHUHÁHFWVDQDXWRPDWLFquid pro quo with judges mechanically enforcing
patent awards.58
The comparison with the Supreme Court raises the question of why the Federal Circuit—
often seen as a non-political court that deals with a specialized and obscure area of
law59—still uses formalistic rhetoric when the need for “protective coloration” might seem
less pressing. But this has the causation backwards. Despite the perception, intellectual
property issues are in fact quite policy driven and ideologically charged: when the cases go
to the Supreme Court, the “conservative” justices predictably rule in favor of intellectual
property owners, and the “liberal” justices predictably rule in favor of accused infringers.60
It is precisely because the Federal Circuit uses so much formalistic rhetoric and protective
coloration that it is still perceived as a non-political court dealing with a technocratic area,
despite the reality that it is largely making ideological policy judgments like any other
court. All courts have always sought to cover their policy judgments from scrutiny by
hiding those policy judgments behind the perception that judges are apolitical experts.61
The Federal Circuit is simply more successful than other courts in this endeavor, because
LWFDQFODLPWKDWWKHLVVXHVIDOOLQJZLWKLQLWVGRPDLQDUHUHVROYHGXVLQJDSROLWLFDOVFLHQWLÀF
expertise in addition to apolitical legal expertise (the latter becoming progressively less
persuasive with the advance of legal realism).627KHWDFWLFRISURIHVVLRQDOP\VWLÀFDWLRQ
remains the same; the difference is only the degree of success.
Whether preaching formalism while practicing pragmatism is “legitimate” is a question
beyond the scope of this Essay.63 The point is only that, as a descriptive matter, this

58. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona),
99 GEO. L.J. 1, 42 (2010) (arguing that the court uses “stealth overruling” to give different messages to different audiences); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
581, 589 (1990) (“I never thought Oliver Wendell Holmes and the legal realists did us a favor by pointing out
WKDWDOOWKHVHOHJDOÀFWLRQVZHUHÀFWLRQV7KRVHMXGJHVZLVHHQRXJKWREHWUXVWHGZLWKWKHVHFUHWDOUHDG\NQHZ
it.”).
59. CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 33 (2008); see Ann Bartow, When Bias is Bipartisan:
Teaching About the Democratic Process in an Intellectual Property Law Republic, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 715,
715 (2008).
60. Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An
Empirical Study, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 801, 803–04 (2009).
61. POSNER, supra note 51, at 3.
62. Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 49, 63 (Amy
*XWPDQQHG  ´7KHUHDOVRXUFHRIWKHMXGLFLDOSUREOHPWKDWWURXEOHV-XVWLFH6FDOLDOLHVLQRXUGHP\VWLÀcation of the law.”).
63. Compare Friedman, supra note 58, at 55-56 (arguing for greater transparency to facilitate public debate
over constitutional meaning) with Wells, supra note 56, at 1069 (arguing that “appearance management is a vital feature of Supreme Court decisionmaking”) and Scalia, supra note 58, at 589. See also Paul Butler, When
Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785 (2007).
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is something practiced by virtually every court and every judge in the United States.
The common claim that the Federal Circuit is formalistic thus needs a great deal of
TXDOLÀFDWLRQDWOHDVWLQWKHDUHDRISDWHQWVFRSH/LNHHYHU\RWKHUFRXUWWKH)HGHUDO
Circuit uses formalist rhetoric. Moreover, like many other areas of law, the formalist
rhetoric cloaks what in actuality is a great deal of pragmatic discretion. Rumors of Federal
Circuit exceptionalism in this regard, it would appear, have been greatly exaggerated.

IP THEORY

Volume 1: Issue 2

99

